Protecting device functionality, not only data
IoT devices are now used in healthcare, energy, education and oil production in Kuwait, in line with the digital-transformation goals of Kuwait Vision 2035. Existing security measures mainly protect the confidentiality and integrity of data. Few address device functionality, that is, the risk that a sequence of legitimate-looking actions drives a device into an unsafe state. Static, rule-based defenses also adapt poorly to changing environments.
The project builds an adaptive security framework grounded in the theory of computation. Each IoT device is paired with an automaton that describes its legitimate behavior. An edge server uses observations of the environment and the system to relabel parts of each automaton with vulnerability scores. A threat can then be detected and contained as the device approaches a vulnerable state, before service is disrupted or the device is compromised.
Excessive blocking would make devices unusable. A reinforcement-learning controller therefore tunes the aggressiveness of relabeling to balance threat prevention against service availability.
Research questions
- Modeling behavior
How can an IoT device's legitimate behavior be modeled as an automaton whose states, transitions and sequences can be relabeled as vulnerable at runtime, in response to environmental and system conditions?
- Scoring vulnerability
How can a quantitative vulnerability score be defined and computed at runtime so that it captures proximity to unsafe states or sequences more expressively than a binary label?
- Adaptive control
How can a reinforcement-learning controller tune the aggressiveness of relabeling to balance security against availability, and under what conditions does it converge to a stable, safe policy?
- Measurable benefit
Does the integrated approach reduce exposure to vulnerable and unsafe states, relative to a static rule-based baseline, while preserving each device's declared critical functions?
System architecture
The system comprises interconnected IoT devices, the wireless network that links them, and one automaton per device. An edge server collects observations, updates each automaton and reconfigures system parameters. Each operating period has five stages.
- ES
Environment sensing
Devices observe their surroundings and collect only the data required, to avoid overloading the network and the analysis.
- DT
Data transfer
Observations are sent over the wireless network to the edge server, with communication resources managed to avoid interruption.
- EP
Edge processing
The edge server maintains a compact model of the current environment and system state.
- AU
Automata update
States, transitions or sequences are relabeled as vulnerable, each with a score, based on new observations and history.
- RLT
RL tuning
Over longer horizons, an RL agent balances threat prevention against service availability.
Relabeling and vulnerability scoring
Threats rarely correspond to a single state, so the relabeling algorithm must decide when to relabel, what to relabel (a state, a transition or a sequence) and how strongly. Detection is based on proximity: the closer the current execution is to a vulnerable part of the automaton, the higher its score. Candidate formulations include reachability distance and weighted risk propagation.
Security versus availability
Each state corresponds to a function the device provides, so every block has a cost. A security control parameter sets the share of states that may be flagged, and a reinforcement-learning agent learns this parameter from network conditions and threat history. If the agent does not converge, the system falls back to a bounded heuristic policy.
Testbed
Evaluation will use a laboratory testbed of programmable IoT nodes (Raspberry Pi devices with sensors, connected through a gateway) that emulate a smart meter, a sensing and actuation node and a network node. The University of Ottawa will provide access to the uOttawa–IBM Cyber Range for additional datasets and attack scenarios.
Key performance indicators
| Area | Indicator | Target |
|---|---|---|
| Technical | Vulnerability detection accuracy | ≥ 90% |
| Efficiency | Average automaton update latency | ≤ 200 ms |
| Adaptability | RL controller convergence | < 10 epochs |
| Impact | Misuse incidents, downtime and manual interventions relative to a static rule-based baseline | Reduced |
| Dissemination | Peer-reviewed papers | ≥ 4 |
| Outreach | Workshops and seminars at GUST | ≥ 4 |
Deliverables
- Automata-based model of IoT device behavior (software module)
- Reinforcement-learning adaptive defense module
- Integrated system prototype, validated on the laboratory testbed
- Three to four conference papers and one to two journal papers
- Openly available reference implementation and dataset repository
- Research assistant training and student workshops on IoT security
Timeline
The project runs for 24 months in six phases, each with acceptance criteria.
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Months 1–3 · Sep–Nov 2026Current
Setup and requirements
Finalize requirements, procure the testbed, arrange access to the uOttawa–IBM Cyber Range, specify the static baseline and onboard the research assistant.
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Months 4–8 · Dec 2026–Apr 2027
Automaton modeling and device profiles
Define the automaton formalism and model representative devices.
Gate: at least three device automata, including a complete smart-meter model.
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Months 9–13 · May–Sep 2027
Relabeling and vulnerability scoring
Implement the triggering mechanism, the selection of relabeling targets and the scoring function.
Gate: detection accuracy ≥ 90% and update latency ≤ 200 ms.
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Months 14–17 · Oct 2027–Jan 2028
RL controller design and training
Define states, actions and rewards; train the controller and integrate it with relabeling, including safe fallbacks.
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Months 18–21 · Feb–May 2028
Integration and prototype
Run the complete sensing, edge, relabeling and RL pipeline on the testbed.
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Months 22–24 · Jun–Aug 2028
Evaluation and dissemination
Benchmark against the baseline, report KPIs, publish results and release the code and datasets.

